

The background of the entire page is a close-up, slightly blurred image of US currency. In the foreground, several hundred-dollar bills are visible, featuring the portrait of Benjamin Franklin. To the left, a large roll of US currency is partially unspooled, showing the intricate details of the paper money. The lighting is soft, highlighting the texture of the bills and the metallic sheen of the roll.

# CLIMATE 21 PROJECT

## TRANSITION MEMO

Office of  
Management  
and Budget

# Office of Management and Budget

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This memo is part of the **Climate 21 Project**, which taps the expertise of more than 150 experts with high-level government experience, including nine former cabinet appointees, to deliver actionable advice for a rapid-start, whole-of-government climate response coordinated by the White House and accountable to the President.

The full set of Climate 21 Project memos is available at [climate21.org](https://climate21.org).



# Office of Management and Budget

## Executive Summary

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is positioned at the center of the Executive Branch with a key role in coordinating policy, budgets, regulations, executive orders, and management priorities across the government. As such, OMB will be essential to the administration's success on climate. It will be particularly critical in the transition and early days of an administration to navigate a series of critical budget, regulatory and management decisions that come quickly in the first 100 days, including the following:

- Executive Orders (Days 1-100)
- FY2021 omnibus deal (as early as February)
- Potential economic stimulus (as early as February)
- State of the Union (late February)
- FY2022 President's budget request (late February to March)
- Potential world leaders climate summit (before May 1)
- Regulation repeal through the Congressional Review Act (first 60 legislative days for rules finalized in last 90 legislative days)
- President's Management Agenda (as early as April 1)

Decisions made in the first 100 days will directly impact progress on climate action in the first two years of the first term. Moreover, they will be critical early signals of climate's importance to domestic and international constituencies.

To support the administration's climate agenda, the incoming OMB team will need to act quickly and effectively in a fast-paced and challenging environment. During transition and in these first crucial days, the White House and agencies will be short-staffed and focused on bringing on personnel and other urgent issues. The pandemic will add operational and policy complexities to addressing climate priorities in the midst of another urgent and ongoing crisis. And budgets across the government beyond pandemic response may be constrained due to the economic crisis.

The purpose of this memorandum is to help the OMB leadership team and broader administration leadership achieve a strong start on climate action. Four critical OMB components will make the difference in navigating these obstacles and achieving success on climate priorities:

**Organizing for high impact.** This memo makes personnel and process recommendations, so OMB is best positioned to address climate issues within the first 100 days and beyond as a team. Accordingly, the memo recommends adjustments to individual and team portfolio configurations and business processes that can lead to higher impact while factoring in the limits of OMB's institutional culture and resources.

**Preparing for FY2021 and FY2022 climate budget decisions.** This memo provides a baseline of budget priorities to align with likely climate goals of a new administration. With this "homework" begun early, OMB's new budget leadership can move more quickly to align policy and implementation to the new President's priorities, through negotiation and execution of FY2021 appropriations and through formulation of the FY2022 President's Budget and any economic recovery packages.

**Developing an OIRA plan for major climate regulatory decisions, including regulatory guidance to reinstate the social cost of carbon and account for social justice metrics.** This memo also provides a baseline of climate regulatory issues to address. It offers a draft plan of action to address these priorities. With this draft plan, new OIRA leadership can move quickly to align policy and implementation to the new administration's regulatory priorities.

**Injecting climate in the President's Management Agenda.** Finally, this memo begins to identify areas where climate considerations should be incorporated in OMB's cross-government management priorities. OMB should move early to provide guidance to agencies to begin to account for climate in their procurement decisions, strategic planning and performance management, etc.

## Office of Management and Budget

### TOP RECOMMENDATIONS: ORGANIZATION AND BUDGET

- Designate day-to-day OMB leadership for the climate portfolio. Vest day-to-day cross-OMB leadership in the right person (e.g., Budget Deputy Director, Counselor, Executive Associate Director (EAD) or a revamped climate Program Associate Director (PAD))
- Institute OMB-wide, team-based approach. Include OIRA administrator and Deputy Director for Management as senior team to drive progress across OMB (e.g., an OMB climate plan with monthly OMB senior leadership climate meetings for accountability)
- Staff OIRA with executive-branch-experienced regulatory leadership to avoid time lost from on-the-job-training. Foster strong relationships between OIRA administrator and agency heads
- Approach FY2021 appropriations as an opportunity to kick-start climate action by negotiating targeted programmatic increases and legislative fixes in omnibus negotiations
- Advance climate action through FY2021 budget execution through reprogramming and other adjustments
- Produce an FY2022 budget request that begins to deliver on ambitious climate goals related to clean energy and net-zero emissions, improved resilience, international climate leadership, environmental justice, and economic justice/worker protections.
- Prepare a meaningful package of budget deliverables for key events: a world leaders climate summit, State of the Union, and other senior-level bilateral and multilateral international engagements
- Implement technical approaches early such as tracking funding directed to disadvantaged communities, issuing early guidance to staff and agencies, improving scoring rules to foster climate investments, and re-starting a climate cross-cut during transition

### TOP RECOMMENDATIONS: REGULATIONS AND MANAGEMENT

- Pause Trump Administration rules that are harmful to the climate, repeal recent rules through CRA, address key climate rules through accelerated process, and conduct a retrospective regulatory review
- Use Statement of Regulatory Principles to achieve climate goals. Issue early guidance to reinstate social cost of carbon analysis and incorporate social justice metrics in rulemaking
- Leverage the procurement power of the federal government. Work with agencies to incorporate Buy America, Buy Clean, Project Labor Agreements, and other climate and environmental/social justice criteria in procurement mechanisms
- Enhance cross-government sustainability. Direct agencies to devise agency sustainability plans, including metrics and plans for key climate outcomes such as enhanced energy efficiency
- Establish a federal energy efficiency fund. Set aside a fund (perhaps modeled on IT Modernization Fund) to support agency investments that enhance energy efficiency, potentially administered via GSA with DOE in a technical advisory capacity

# 1 Organizational Recommendations

Because OMB is positioned at the center of a broad portfolio and is often forced to operate in reactive crisis response as part of the Executive Office of the President, the transition team and incoming agency leadership should prioritize making effective initial organizational decisions—from personnel to process—that can increase OMB’s efficacy on climate action.

## PERSONNEL

While there is no substitute for clear and regular political prioritization by the President, during the transition and within the first 100 days, OMB should consider several personnel steps to build in climate as an all-leadership-team approach, sustain an ongoing high priority, and successfully meet early climate timelines such as the FY2022 budget, a 100-day world leader climate summit, and the Nationally Determined Contributions formulation.

**Identify and empower day-to-day OMB leadership for the climate portfolio.** Appreciating that OMB has a relatively rigid institutional structure, identify dedicated day-to-day leadership. This primary leadership role likely resides with the Budget Deputy or the Program Associate Director (PAD), although other structures are possible. Three options, along with benefits and drawbacks of each, are provided below.

- **Create a Climate, Energy, and Environment (CEE) PAD and designate this person as OMB lead.** Rename and restructure the Natural Resources and Environment Program Associate Director (PAD) portfolio, so that it includes NOAA, NIST, and FEMA along with USDA, DOI, DOE, and EPA. Make it clear to all PADs that the CEE PAD has cross-functional responsibility for climate change within OMB and as primary day-to-day representative within the EOP. This portfolio option is similar to the dedicated health care PAD created in Clinton and Obama administrations. One downside of this option is that it may be difficult for the PAD to work across OMB leadership due to the more junior position, but it depends on the person selected. It may also create some institutional frictions that could slow progress; however, the shifts are not major and there may be an opportunity to avoid frictions if these adjustments are made as new PADs are onboarded.
- **Make climate a priority for the Deputy Director for Budget.** Mandate climate as one of the Deputy Director’s top three priorities. This option helps drive the climate agenda by increasing responsiveness among the career staff across OMB. One downside is that due to the deputy’s portfolio, it can be difficult to sustain focus on climate as a priority.
- **Consider Cross-OMB leadership role.** Alternatively, the OMB director could establish a front-office position focused on climate agenda across OMB (budget, management, regulations, legislative issues) through a Senior Advisor for Climate or the Executive Associate Director position (EAD). The EAD position has been used intermittently at OMB, and has sometimes been a role empowered as ‘first among PADs’ or just below Deputy status. However, it has had a mixed record of success and would require a unique individual and clear chain of command/portfolio delineation to successfully execute. This concept does help solve for the deputies problem of being unable to sustain long-term focus.

**Make climate a priority for the Deputy Director for Management.** Regardless of the OMB point person, mandate that the Deputy Director for Management engage on agency decarbonization and adaptation plans, as well as procurement initiatives.

**Hire experienced top OIRA leaders (administrator and associate administrators).** Hire experienced top leadership, so that OIRA is able to start strong on what will be a very challenging regulatory agenda in addition to climate. (See further OIRA organizational recommendations in section 3.)

**Institute senior meetings to drive progress.** Restore a successful practice from late in the Obama administration to hold regular (monthly) OMB senior leadership meetings on climate agenda to provide progress updates, improve coordination, and develop strategy. Meeting would be called by the OMB Director or a designated day-to-day leader.

## CAPABILITIES AND PROCESSES

In parallel to initial efforts to adjust FY2021 and develop FY2022 budgets, OMB leadership should take steps to drive more cohesive and coordinated processes on climate issues:

**Issue early guidance to OMB staff and agencies.** Early guidance to and through OMB will help quickly pivot the government toward climate and environmental justice goals:

- The OMB transition team should communicate the incoming President's climate priority to OMB staff as soon as possible during the transition so that staff can immediately begin to prepare internal analyses and issue papers to partner with and support the transition team.
- The OMB Director should also officially convey this after inauguration, so staff can begin pivoting agency priorities.
- The Director should issue government-wide direction to agencies (e.g. through a budget process memorandum) to begin to reprogram funds and adjust budget execution toward climate and—environmental justice goals as soon as possible in FY2021, to revise their budget plans for FY2022, and as needed—provide guidance on the criteria to be used in formulating stimulus measures.

**Improve scoring.** Update scoring rules to make long-term climate investments and third-party financing more feasible budgetarily (e.g., revisiting rules for scoring long-term leases, purchases, and federal investments that currently make some important investments cost-prohibitive from a scoring perspective).

**Track climate budgets across government.** Amend OMB's official budget guidance documents (e.g. Circular A-11) to re-establish climate budget tracking across international and domestic agencies including tracking funding directed to disadvantaged communities to address disparities in environmental justice outcomes. Tracking this funding centrally will focus agency attention on the issue and improve the administration's visibility into climate budgets.

**Set aside central climate funding.** Recognizing that many demands will be competing for funds in the President's first budget (for FY2022), set aside a portion of the Director's discretionary funding for climate-specific investments, to be allocated during FY2022 budget formulation. These funds can be used to:

- Increase agency budgets that propose highest impact climate proposals
- Reward coordinated cross-agency proposals (e.g. State/Treasury on international financing, USFS/USDA on wildfire resilience).

*(continued)*

## Create a FY2023 unified climate budget.

- Starting with the FY2023 President's Budget guidance, pilot a cross-agency, coordinated climate budget formulation exercise, with input from other EOP offices with climate equities (e.g. the AP for Climate and the proposed National Climate Council, NSC, NEC, DPC, CEQ, OSTP, USTR)
- Over time, depending on Congressional make-up, consider proposing a revised climate funding process to Congress to address siloed committees.
- While such steps would enhance agency budget coordination and coherence, OMB leadership should remain cognizant of the risk of a central climate budget becoming a target in a different political environment.
- Consider options that would also enhance the survivability of climate budget components (e.g. seeking corresponding legislative language or mandatory funding that would be more robust to changing political winds).



## 2 Budget Recommendations

OMB's budgeting responsibilities will be fundamental to the success of the new administration's climate agenda. Given the scope of the challenge, historic investments will be needed across the federal government to meet likely climate targets — at the same time as the country faces unprecedented economic and pandemic challenges. This section aims to support the new administration as it makes critical budget decisions related to FY2021 and FY2022 funding, as well as on economic recovery legislation, by identifying a range of programs that support climate goals.

### OVERVIEW

**Developing a climate budget framework for FY2021 and FY2022.** This memo seeks to prepare the incoming administration by answering these key questions:

- **FY2021 budget completion and execution:**
  - What are the existing major climate-related programs?
  - What programs might the new administration prioritize adjusting budget levels in a potential FY2021 omnibus, and/or by executing agency spending during the first fiscal year (which ends in September 2021)?
- **FY2022 budget request:**
  - Within the framework of the financial resources that are needed for climate (including environmental justice, clean energy, and sustainable infrastructure), what are opportunities in the President's first budget request that will accelerate climate action in the President's second year?
  - What budget programs can send the message that climate is a top priority?
  - In the event of an economic stimulus, what existing budget programs can support both economic recovery (i.e., quickly and efficiently create jobs) and climate action (i.e., mitigate emissions or increase adaptation)?

**Creating a baseline of climate-related budget priorities.** To answer these questions, this memo develops a baseline of major climate-related priorities in order to:

- **Provide a government-wide approach.** The climate priorities baseline consists of 60-70 climate-related programs and budget accounts across 17 major agencies, including programs in agencies covered by other Climate21 memos as well as other agencies.
- **Establish a foundation from which a new administration can add.** The budget baseline approach does not seek to be an exhaustive list or create a comprehensive "climate budget." It does, importantly, provide a foundation on which the new Administration can build.
- **Develop a tool for multiple climate stakeholders.** The climate budget baseline seeks to assist the following stakeholders: 1) transition teams; 2) OMB senior management and career budget teams; 3) senior administration climate leaders; and 4) agency heads and their budget teams.

**Approach.** To develop this baseline of climate related priorities, the Climate 21 Project reviewed various climate expenditure reports (e.g. from OMB and GAO), and the budgets of seven departments and agencies with climate responsibilities (USDA, DOE, DOI, State, DOT, Treasury, and EPA). The sections that follow describe the budget context for a climate budget and potential approaches for prioritizing climate in FY2021 and FY2022 funding. In addition, Annex A is a one-page summary of potential FY2021 actions across agencies and Annex B collates programs and budget accounts across government that broadly may have climate implications.

## CONTEXT

This section provides a brief background on major issues that affect climate budget development and execution that the transition team and the new OMB team should factor into their considerations.

### *The overall political and fiscal context*

**Congressional majorities will have major effects on budget decisions that will impact climate investments:**

- **Reconciliation.** If Democrats control the House and Senate, budget reconciliation offers the opportunity for a simple majority to enact major fiscal policy and investments. If Republicans continue to control the Senate, budget reconciliation is unavailable, and 60 votes are needed there for spending bills. Additionally, any change to the filibuster could dramatically affect major legislation vote thresholds.
- **Discretionary budget caps.** The Budget Control Act (BCA) expires at the end of FY2021. If Democrats control the House and Senate, the likelihood that BCA caps (and/or sequestration) return is low. If Republicans retain the Senate, they may seek to negotiate caps; however, with the BCA sunset, a new bill would be required to establish new caps, giving Democrats significant leverage in any negotiations.

**Current and new budget pressures may put downward pressure on FY2021 and FY2022:**

- **COVID implications.** Potential 2021 funding for COVID health care and economic recovery may be needed and be considered more urgent (and more bipartisan) than climate spending.
- **Other administration priorities.** The administration's other spending priorities (e.g., health care, social justice, education, child care) may affect the scale of climate investments.
- **Debt implications.** With the debt increased by ~\$4 trillion over the past year alone, deficit hawks may seek to limit major additional spending.

### *The opportunities and challenges of executing climate action through the federal budget process*

**While the federal budget is massive, the climate challenge calls for major increases in federal spending amid a challenging fiscal environment:**

- **Investment size.** GAO has concluded<sup>1</sup> that the federal government has spent around \$154 billion cumulatively across 19 agencies on climate change since 1993, in the areas of climate science, clean energy technology, and international assistance. The highest proposed annual amount of \$13.2 billion in the FY2017 budget falls far short of more recent proposals (e.g., for \$2 trillion or more in spending) from Congress and other parties.
- **Other funding sources.** Beyond direct federal spending, however, federal actions can serve to mobilize funding from the private sector through government financing (e.g. loans, insurance) or through regulatory and tax policy that shape the economy over the long term.

## While there are many opportunities, federal budgets alone cannot meet climate goals:

- **Short-term window.** Climate action requires sustained, fundamental changes to the US. economy and social behaviors over decades. Federal budgets—while massive—are annual and often incremental.
- **Limited discretion.** Many major grant programs (e.g., transportation, agriculture) offer little to no administrative discretion to make large changes for climate.
- **Siloed budgeting.** There is no single “climate budget.” While this makes it harder for climate spending to be targeted in one place in an adverse political environment, agencies and Congressional committees operate in siloes, rather than coordinating their approaches or developing cohesive strategies or budgets.

## Beyond annual budgets, authorizing legislation will likely drive broader climate action:

- **Major climate legislation.** The true pathway to meeting climate targets may need to be met through major climate legislation. As of July 2020, there were a few major bills in the House and Senate including the House Select Committee’s report: *Solving the Climate Crisis: The Congressional Action Plan for a Clean Energy Economy and a Healthy, Resilient, and Just America*.
- **Authorization legislation.** Other authorization bills will also provide opportunities for climate progress (e.g., surface transportation, farm bill, National Defense Authorization Act).

## Budget structure and development

### There are several critical macro-budget decisions that will impact the size of climate investments:

- **Budget structure.** The White House will make major topline spending decisions about expiring discretionary caps and whether to treat defense and non-defense spending separately going forward, as well as scoring and Overseas Contingency Operations, which will impact total spending available for climate.
- **Economic outlook.** OMB, Treasury, and CEA teams together formulate macroeconomic assumptions (e.g. related to expected economic growth rates) which will affect revenue and deficit projections.
- **Revenue raisers.** Incoming leadership will need to decide whether to pursue additional revenue options, including taxes and fees, which can be either directly related to climate or can indirectly create space for climate investments (e.g. through repealing the Trump Administration’s \$1.7 trillion in tax cuts, instituting a carbon tax, or using border adjustments).

### The new team will need to make budget trade-offs and prioritization decisions on climate

Answering a few key questions can help with this process:

- **Sectors.** Should we prioritize mitigation (emissions reductions, carbon removal), resilience, or adaptation investments? With respect to emissions, which sectors should we give the highest priority: energy/electricity, transportation, buildings, or industry?
- **Technology.** Should we favor renewables, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, or cleaner fossil fuels (e.g. using carbon capture and storage or carbon dioxide removal) as a bridge to a lower carbon future? Within each broad technology sector, what sub-segment should we prioritize? (E.g. getting proven technologies to commercialization, or breakthrough technologies, etc.)
- **State of development.** Where should the public sector focus investment: basic vs. applied R&D, early deployment pilots, commercial scale but risky, etc:
- **Domestic/international.** Is it more effective to invest in aggressive domestic targets (supporting progress toward Paris emissions/temperature goal, leading by example) or to invest overseas (supporting Paris climate finance goal, bolstering our international influence, more efficient emissions reductions)?

- **Agency/modality.** Which agencies and policy interventions or modalities are best suited to make the most climate impact? Regulatory action, direct federal assistance, block grants to state entities, mobilizing the private sector, etc.

**A number of prioritization criteria should be considered.** In deciding what investments of money, leadership time, and political capital to prioritize, the new leadership team should consider several criteria:

- **Cost, efficiency, and impact.** Which interventions achieve the biggest impact most efficiently and effectively? (E.g. by assessing the costs per ton of emissions reduced, total cost at scale, and evidence of impact of an intervention.)
- **Leverage.** Does an action by the federal government have the potential to mobilize resources, energy, and innovation from other sources? (E.g. states, other donors (nations or philanthropies), private sector, academia, etc.)
- **Additionality.** Is the intervention an appropriate role for the federal government, or could it be done by the private sector?
- **Strategic/political considerations.** In each area of investment, is an incremental approach or a more fundamental transformation more likely to succeed? Can progress be achieved administratively or is legislative action required? Given the political environment and operational challenges, what is the likelihood of success?
- **Political durability.** Is a particular program likely to survive in a new political context? Are there plausible legislative or mandatory funding options that would achieve similar outcomes and provide more stability under different political circumstances?

## FY2021 BUDGET COMPLETION AND EXECUTION

Funding for climate priorities in the new administration's first 8-14 months<sup>1</sup> will be determined by FY2021 appropriations. The new administration may have a very short window after inauguration to potentially negotiate adjustments to FY2021 appropriations and to alter how agencies execute their FY2021 funds.

**Appropriations.** A new Congress will be seated in January 2021 and—assuming the government is operating on a continuing resolution (CR)—one of its early priorities will be to enact full-year FY2021 appropriations through an omnibus bill or a few smaller “mini-bus” bills. Appropriations committees and subcommittees will have marked up their draft bills in the summer and fall of 2020 within the caps and topline established by the last FY2019/FY2020 budget deal between the Trump administration and Congress. As such, there will likely be only a narrow scope for changes to bills, though this could be impacted by the outcome of Congressional elections (e.g. House appropriators have proposed emergency COVID spending above the agreed budget deal levels; a newly Democratic Senate could potentially agree to similarly supplement FY2021 levels).

**Budget execution.** Agencies will have prepared their FY2021 budget requests and spending plans assuming a continuing Trump presidency. Once funds are enacted, agencies will need guidance quickly on how to alter their execution plans to better reflect the priorities of the new administration (e.g. by reprogramming funds to more climate friendly allocations or by using climate criteria to allocate funds).

The Climate 21 Project has assembled a baseline of existing climate-related programs and consulted with various agency budget experts to identify a short-list of programs the new administration should focus on in FY2021. (See Annex A for a cross-government table of FY2021 climate actions.)

<sup>1</sup> This period consists of the time remaining in FY2021 after inauguration of the new President (late Jan through Sept. 2021) plus a likely continuing resolution period that could extend well into FY2022 (CR's often extend to December and sometimes into Feb/March).



## ***FY2021 appropriations priorities***

As the administration negotiates final FY2021 appropriations with Congress, OMB will develop a list of priorities for both funding levels and legislative language (policy riders). The Climate 21 Project has identified this starting list which the transition teams can refine with OMB career staff and agency teams:

### **Seek funding increases or shifts for targeted programs:**

- **Climate research.** Increase or shift funding (even if modestly in FY2021) to restart climate research (e.g. revive the multi-agency U.S. Global Change Research Program).
- **Targeted staffing.** Increase funding for climate-related personnel and offices (e.g. EPA climate capacity, State Dept. climate envoy, USDA climate hubs, DOT climate coordinators within modal administrations). In several agencies, steps taken by the previous administration have led to significant attrition, vacancies and morale issues; where Congress continued to fund operations more generously, funding levels may be sufficient, but may need to be reallocated by Congress (or with Congressional approval) to climate-related functions (e.g. within DOI's BLM and BIA to focus on restoration and renewables permitting vs. oil & gas).
- **Flex funding.** Seek funding flexibility or small pots of discretionary funding for Secretaries to address 'quick-hit' priorities before seeking FY2022 funding. While appropriators have tended to increase restrictions on agencies due to concerns with Trump administration policies, more flexible climate funding may be more palatable with a new administration and/or new Congress.
- **Signaling investments.** Seek modest funding for targeted items that signal important changes in direction and/or kick-start further investments in FY2022 and beyond (e.g. the State Dept. should work with Congress to increase funding for the IPCC/UNFCCC in concert with rejoining the Paris agreement; DOE should seek ARPA-E increases and funding for CO<sub>2</sub> removal (CDR) pilot).

### **Legislative language fixes/policy riders:**

- **GCF restrictions.** In the State/Foreign Operations (SFOPs) bill, avoid or remove riders impacting Green Climate Funding (which were put in place after the Obama administration, but recently were not included in the FY2020 bill) to allow possibility of GCF funding by State and/or Treasury Departments.
- **Coal riders.** In the SFOPs and Financial Services & General Government (FSGG) bills, remove riders that protect (or seek riders that restrict) coal project funding through the multilateral development banks (MDBs), Export Import Bank of the US (ExIm), or the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).
- **EV charging.** In the Transportation bill, address language restricting electric vehicle (EV) charging stations at rest stops.

## ***FY2021 execution priorities***

OMB and agency leadership will need to work with agencies to pivot various activities toward climate priorities (clean energy, decarbonization, resilience/adaptation, etc.) using enacted FY2021 funds, as well as any available prior year or no-year carryover funding. The Climate 21 Project has identified a starting list that the transition teams can refine with OMB career staff and agency teams (see also Annex A):

### **Re-programming funding or reorient program priorities:**

- **Redirect R&D.** Refocus DOE national labs toward climate research. The labs have both funding and expertise, but will need new direction and flexibility to make changes. Similarly, reorient existing USDA and DOI research funding (ARS, ERS, NIFA at USDA, and USGS at DOI) toward climate.

- **Target programs.** At DOE, redirect grant-making in Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) & Fossil Energy (FE) programs toward breakthrough technologies vs. more mature technologies that are already commercializing. Within State/USAID, target Congressionally-directed environment-focused foreign assistance programs toward mitigation, adaptation, etc.
- **Add climate criteria.** Add climate criteria to existing programs with administrative discretion (e.g. at DOT, add climate elements to \$1 billion BUILD (formerly TIGER) grants, and more stringent air-quality conditions on CMAQ funding). Within DOI, incorporate criteria re: adaptation/resilience to National Park Service and Fish & Wildlife operating plans.
- **Target international finance.** Direct US international financing agencies to prioritize climate finance (e.g. lending, guarantees, equity investments, insurance for climate projects; bilateral development and export financings through DFC and ExIm). Likewise, Treasury should take steps to redirect multilateral financing institutions (e.g. the World Bank, other MDBs, the GCF) that the US supports to prioritize climate.

### Other FY2021 execution efforts:

- **Re-launch GCCI with existing funding.** Restore Obama Administration's Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) as both an organizing framework for foreign assistance, and to signal US commitment to international partners. The State Department and USAID can use existing economic/development funding from FY2020 and FY2021 that Congress has earmarked for environmental assistance to relaunch in FY2021. Treasury funding appropriated for the Global Environment Fund can also be counted, as can other funding with a dual purpose including climate, e.g. climate-resilient infrastructure investments, portions of humanitarian funding used to respond to climate disasters, or select agricultural assistance (e.g. climate resilient seeds).
- **Use carryover funding.** In addition to redirecting FY2021 funds, review funding "pipelines" of prior year unobligated funds, or stalled/delayed/lower-priority projects that no longer need funding. Redirect these funds to key deliverables needed in FY2021 prior to FY2022 budgets becoming available (e.g. direct State/USAID to review carryover balances to fund international climate finance, through DFC financing or an initial tranche of GCF funding). At DOE, carryover funding at national labs can be redirected to climate research.
- **Mobilize other funding.** Emphasize USG interventions that mobilize funding, energy, and innovation toward climate ends through partnerships with the private sector, academia, philanthropies (e.g. using lending, insurance, climate risk pools and other innovative finance; or, internationally, coordinating State/USAID, MCC, USTDA, DFC, and ExIm efforts to mobilize the private sector). Additionally, redirect flexible foreign assistance funding to programs that support private-sector engagement and mobilize partner-country domestic resources. As the US prepares budget deliverables for climate meetings and summits, use funding mechanism such as contributions matching and conditionality to build capacity, extract policy reforms, and catalyze funding from other donors, academic institutions, etc.
- **Fees/permitting changes.** Refocus DOI/BLM and Indian Affairs permitting approvals to renewables. Where administrative discretion is available, adjust leasing fees to support decarbonization efforts (e.g. increase cost of O&G leasing vs. renewables, create parity for onshore and offshore oil and gas fees).

## FUNDING AMBITIOUS CLIMATE ACTION THROUGH ECONOMIC RECOVERY FUNDS AND FY2022 BUDGET REQUEST

Addressing climate change is an historic challenge that requires historic public investments. The new administration may have an opportunity to obtain these funds through economic recovery package and its first budget request (and subsequent budgets). These two initial Congressional requests will send a strong message about climate and economic recovery as priorities, and their disposition will drive success in the first term.

**Navigating primary challenges.** The incoming OMB team will face two immediate challenges: 1) translating an ambitious climate plan into agency-based budget programs within a tight window (November-March); and 2) reconciling the plan's funding ambition with fiscal constraints.

- **Translating an ambitious climate plan into detailed budget requests.** Some climate actions will require simple increases to existing programs. Other actions require new policy design and development. Other actions will likely require policy development beyond economic recovery package and budget request (e.g., transportation reauthorization issues). Due to timing issues, OMB will likely be creating these requests in parallel.
- **Funding climate action within the available budget envelope.** Funding the plan will require funds supplementing the annual budget process and new revenues or funding offsets. Within the annual budget, the climate-related funds will likely compete with other major priorities and will require hard choices about which components of the various plans are most critical to fund.

**Creating the building blocks so the new OMB team can act quickly and effectively in a challenging environment.** This section and Annex B seek to place the building blocks together for funding the plan. It organizes these building blocks through a three-step approach:

- **First, this section utilizes publicly declared climate proposals** as an organizing framework.
- **Second, the plan is supplemented with recommended climate budget programs** from the Climate 21 Project agency memos and Obama FY2017 budget requests, so OMB has a comprehensive list of building blocks. These programs are listed in Annex B and agency-specific memos.
- **Third, where possible, it connects the building blocks to major budget accounts**, and includes enacted spending levels between FY2016-20 and the Obama-Biden FY2017 request. Through this approach, the team has a baseline and head start on key target accounts and addressable space. Where it is not possible to connect a budget action with an existing budget account/program, we flag these issues as priorities to address. See Annex B for a table of programs across government.

**Key building blocks for an ambitious climate plan include:**

- **Clean energy economy.** Ensure the US achieves a 100% clean energy economy and reaches net-zero emissions no later than 2050;
- **Resilience.** Build a stronger, more resilient nation;
- **International leadership.** Rally the rest of the world to meet the threat of climate change;
- **Environmental justice.** Stand up to the abuse of power by polluters who disproportionately harm communities of color and low-income communities; and
- **Economic justice.** Fulfill our obligation to workers and communities who powered our industrial revolution and subsequent decades of economic growth.

### ***Ensure the US achieves a 100% clean energy economy and reaches net-zero emissions no later than 2050***

Achieving 100% clean energy and economy-wide decarbonization will require significant policy and public investment, and therefore will have potential major budget impacts across several agencies, programs, and budget accounts. Some programmatic increases in this area could be very significant. For example, funding \$400 billion in climate and energy research on a straight-line basis over four or ten years would add \$40 billion to the annual budget. This amount is equivalent to roughly 6% of the entire discretionary budget and exceeds the entire annual DOE budget in FY2020. (A \$100 billion per year annual investment would reflect 15% of the entire discretionary budget and exceed in one year the multi-year \$90 billion clean energy investment begun by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).

**Budget envelope and primary agencies.** This investment level will either require massive shifts or increases in the annual budget or need to be funded through an economic recovery package in addition to annual budget. Even with a recovery package, proposed funding increases of this magnitude will require trade-offs across the budget versus simply with agencies or a sub-set of agencies. Many Cabinet agencies have roles to play in clean economy, and effective implementation will need to be an all-of-government approach. That said, primary agencies include the following: Departments of Energy, Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, and Treasury.

### ***Build a stronger, more resilient nation***

Resilience and adaptation play a critical role in addressing climate impacts that affect the U.S. today and are growing worse. The Climate 21 Project recommends building blocks to further build out transportation and resiliency. For transportation, we recommend adding budget programs from the Obama-Biden FY2017 request regarding clean transportation. For resilience, we recommend a broad approach that includes coastal resilience and—consistent with the Obama-Biden FY2017 request—also drought, crop and other resilience.

**Budget envelope and primary agencies.** Climate resilience affects every major agency, and effective resilience planning needs to be an all-of-government approach. This investment level will likely require a supplemental economic recovery package in addition to the annual budget. Even with a recovery package, funding increases of this magnitude will require trade-offs across the budget versus simply with agencies or a sub-set of agencies. Primary agencies include the following: Transportation, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce (NOAA) and Homeland Security (FEMA). Meeting these goals will likely require significant increases in transportation funding while more limited increases in resilience funding. As a result, the primary trading space for adaptation funding is within these agencies, while transportation will likely require budget-wide trade-offs.

### ***International leadership***

The depth of US commitment to global climate leadership will be measured in part by investments through the budget, such as investments in climate finance vehicles like the Green Climate Fund and foreign assistance to countries taking steps to address climate. It is likely that programmatic increases in this area will be well above \$1 billion. The majority of this funding is in the 150 International Affairs budget function and may require either increases or trade-offs across other portions of the discretionary budget.

**Budget envelope and primary agencies.** Many Cabinet agencies have roles to play in international leadership, and effective global re-engagement will need to be an all-of-government approach. That said, primary agencies include the following: State and USAID bilateral programs and Treasury through multilateral institutions and tax policy. As a result, the primary trading space for international leadership funding is within these agencies and the State and Foreign Operations appropriations subcommittees.

In addition to more detailed budget account/program references in Annex B, the key challenges and pathways for the OMB team in addressing international leadership include:

- **Re-entering the Paris Agreement** does not require significant budgets but signals a pivot in the US role on climate. The State Department should allocate more International Organizations & Program account funding toward the International Panel on Climate Change and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to deliver that signal, but this can be achieved with budget increases below \$10 million and should be straightforward from a budget perspective.
- **Multilateral and bilateral foreign assistance programs.** We recommend an approach that combines both bilateral and multilateral assistance funding. Beyond funding past Green Climate Fund (GCF) commitments, we suggest that OMB work with international agencies to build out a broader international climate initiative for FY2022 in line with the Obama administration's Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCCI). GCCCI aggregated over \$2.5 billion annually through appropriated assistance funds as well as development finance (e.g., OPIC, now DFC) and export credit (e.g., EXIM) levels across major US agencies. Included in GCCCI were significant multilateral programs which support international climate efforts (e.g.,



Green Climate Fund, Global Environment Facility, Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol). GCCCI also included bilateral foreign assistance programs in support of partner countries' mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable landscapes efforts, and could be targeted by region. The GCCCI program was largely disbanded by the current administration although some of the relevant accounts remain in the budget and were supported by Congress. The OMB team should work with State/USAID to reconstruct a revived or renamed GCCCI starting in FY2021 and potentially expanded in the FY2022 budget. This could include commitments to assistance from State/USAID and other development agencies focused on infrastructure like MCC, as well as expanded climate financing, through the GCF, multilateral development banks, and/or US bilateral finance agencies such as the DFC and ExIm.

- **Develop a human capital restoration plan** to rebuild staff capacity and expertise generally and with respect to climate for affected agencies (State, USAID, and other international agencies), particularly those overseeing assistance or finance programs in support of Paris Agreement goals.
- **Fossil fuels and security infrastructure investments.** Agencies should coordinate domestic tax changes with international counterparts to eliminate or at least reduce and harmonize fossil fuels subsidies. The Defense Department should incorporate climate resilience considerations in its security infrastructure investments. OMB should work with agencies to further detail these proposals in a transition or in time for inclusion in the FY2022 budget.

### ***Stand up to the abuse of power by polluters who disproportionately harm communities of color and low-income communities***

Environmental justice funding addresses critical equity issues regarding climate impacts. These effects have been laid bare through the COVID crisis as communities of color suffer much higher rates of morbidity due to their exposure to pollution and lack of health care. Similar dynamics are in play as climate's impact unfolds.

- **Hold polluters accountable.** Under the current Administration, the EPA has referred the fewest number of criminal anti-pollution cases to the Justice Department in 30 years. Funding key accounts in EPA and the Department of Justice to increase enforcement action will send a signal that this is a priority.
- **Ensure access to safe drinking water for all communities.** The primary programs that address these issues are EPA's Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Loan Fund and USDA's Water and Wastewater Grants and Direct Loans. While these programs provide funding, they are administered by formula to states and would likely require legislative changes in order to be targeted to specific communities in need.

**Budget envelope and primary agencies.** Climate justice funding resides mainly in EPA, DOJ, and USDA.

As a result, the primary trading space for resilience funding is within these agencies and the three corresponding appropriations committees. The Climate 21 Project recommends that during the transition, policy teams focus on adding to these recommendations to create a more robust environmental justice plan.

### ***Fulfill our obligation to workers and communities who powered our industrial revolution and subsequent decades of economic growth***

Economic justice funding addresses critical economic equity issues regarding climate impacts. These effects have been laid bare as communities caught in the transition suffer dislocation including higher rates of unemployment.

A robust climate agenda would include investing in communities (coal and other) impacted by the climate transformation, building on the vision in the Obama-Biden Administration's Power+ Plan; securing the benefits for coal miners and their families, including reforms to the black lung benefits program; ensuring that clean economy jobs are good jobs by defending workers' rights to form unions and collectively bargain; pursuing new partnerships to train the workforce for the growing clean energy economy; and funding USDA climate hubs to bring economic and environmental benefits to rural America.

**Budget envelope and primary agencies.** Economic justice funding resides mainly in Commerce, USDA, and DOL, as well as other agencies with a presence in or ability to support worker training and development in impacted communities, such regional development commissions (e.g. Denali, Appalachian). As a result, the primary trading space for resilience funding is within these agencies and their corresponding appropriations committees. The Climate 21 Project recommends that prior to or during the transition, policy teams focus on adding to these recommendations to create a more robust economic justice plan.

# 3 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs

OIRA will play a critical role in achieving success on the climate action. While the current administration has inflicted much damage throughout climate and environment areas through regulation, it has done the same for numerous other priority issues, such as immigration, health care, and education. Achieving success on climate regulation will take place in this broader context of regulatory repair and reform, which makes a focused, disciplined approach that much more important.

This section provides a high-level road map for climate regulatory priorities, while Annex C includes a compilation of key climate regulations and actions. With this baseline in place, OMB agency review team (ART) and new OIRA leadership can move more quickly to align policy and implementation to the new administration's priorities.

## ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES

**Calibrate regulatory action** in order to move quickly on what counts without overwhelming the system and/or creating an external backlash. With so much to do, it is important to calibrate action—to recognize that now is the time to put out the fire. Rebuilding the house will take time.

**Use the right mix and sequencing of tools.** There are a number of tools to implement high-impact actions and send a coherent message. Identifying the right mix and sequencing is key. For example, the rule revision process, where possible, is often best for achieving the most rapid and efficient path to finalization. Also, utilization of agency enforcement action notices and executive orders within the first 100 days are ways to communicate and deliver on a new policy direction.

**Prioritize actions for multi-track execution to gain efficiencies and speed where possible.** Developing a plan that prioritizes and sequences regulatory actions upfront is critical to deliver on the most efficient timeline.

## EARLY ACTIONS

There are two critical actions in the early days of a new administration: withdrawing rules in process and resuming enforcement of certain rules.

**Withdraw harmful rules in process.** The administration should direct agencies to review and withdraw any harmful rules in process on Day 1. As of August 2020, there were 95 climate relevant rules, of which 58 were completed and 37 in process. (See Annex C: Rule and Executive Order Summary).

**Send out enforcement notices.** The administration should also direct agencies to issue enforcement notices communicating that currently unenforced rules will be enforced. For example, EPA announced in March 2020 that it would not enforce civil environmental legal obligations during the COVID-19 pandemic.

### CROSS-CUTTING EXECUTIVE ORDERS FOR ACTION AND AWARENESS

**Withdraw immediately EO 13771:** This EO mandates that no agency can put out a new rule until it withdraws two rules.

**Keep or revise EO 13777:** This EO mandates retrospective review. It is technically neutral and consistent with Obama-Biden regulatory review efforts.

These enforcement notices should be balanced in their messaging. They should be firm about the enforcement actions while giving companies time (e.g., 90 days) to come into compliance. We recommend that the OMB ART update this list and develop draft notices, so that OIRA and agencies may begin to act on Day 1.

## FIRST 100 DAYS

Within the first 100 days, OIRA should act on the following: 1) nullify select regulations through the Congressional Review Act (CRA); 2) issue an EO communicating climate regulatory priorities; 3) develop a comprehensive work plan and governance process.

**Nullify select regulations through the Congressional Review Act.** If there is a Democratic House and Senate, then the administration should review the list of regulations still subject to CRA and work with Congress to use the CRA to nullify certain targeted regulations to be completed within the 60 legislative-day window (usually longer than 60-days). If not done prior to the election, the OMB agency review team should review and update the attached list of regulations for potential CRA nullification to prepare OIRA leadership for implementation.

**Issue executive order (EO).** Within the first 100 days, in coordination with the development of the Climate Ambition Plan proposed in the Climate 21 Project's Executive Office of the President memo, the new administration should consider issuing an EO that communicates regulatory priorities. The EO would do the following: 1) recognize the U.S. has lost ground on climate change and environmental policy over the past four years; 2) identify the progress that was being made in the Obama-Biden administration; 3) convey the new administration's regulation priorities (e.g., this EO could be an updated version of the June 2013 Clean Power Plan EO that addresses what we need to do over 15- to 30-year period to make up ground). Note that this EO could be specifically geared to the Clean Power Plan or be broader. For example, it could focus on other regulations that were withdrawn or reversed, mandate a review, restore and establish a process for updating Obama-era social cost of carbon analysis, add new analyses regarding environment and social justice outcomes, and/or assess underlying analysis through the lens of reducing emissions.

**Identify and expedite priority rules.** The new administration has an opportunity to send a major signal and accelerate work on priority rules by rebooting certain Obama-era rules. This process should be conducted in coordination with the development of the Climate Ambition Plan.

- Identify a top 10-15 priorities by Day 30. Through this process, consider what can be put back in place and when.
- Include a category of relatively low-hanging fruit. For example, a revised methane rule can move quickly. It may need some new data, but the prior rule rests on a solid foundation and is 50-90% complete.
- Minimize unnecessary complications. For example, some technically low-hanging fruit could become a drag on the system, if they create an outsized level of Congressional, industry, or public engagement.
- Bring together OIRA, DDM, and other White House policy officials on the prioritization plan with agencies.
- Execute a two-prong parallel process for prioritized rules to move at maximum speed (rather than a sequential process):
  - Start OIRA Natural Resources, Environment, and Science team on a process of proactively reviewing regulatory impact analysis (RIAs). This analysis will stress test the RIAs by prior administration, so OIRA has ready explanations (e.g., data and analysis quality assessment) when the priority rules arrive from the agencies rather than waiting until agencies submit rules to begin review.
  - Invite public comment on these priority rules. Public comment will likely yield further analysis about the data behind these priority rules.



## OIRA ORGANIZATION

The following recommendations apply broadly to OIRA. Adherence to them will help the regulatory agenda including the climate agenda.

**Develop a prioritization mechanism.** One of the most important things in the first year of the administration is to designate White House senior leadership (e.g., Deputy Chief of Staff for policy) to address prioritization across agencies, so that the administration does not overburden the system, increase regulatory costs, or create a negative narrative.

**Maintain a direct line between OIRA and White House Chief of Staff (COS), White House climate lead, and Cabinet secretaries.** It is important for a functional regulatory process for the OIRA administrator to have a direct line to the White House COS, White House climate lead, and cabinet secretaries, so that secretaries do not make end runs around the process. The OIRA administrator should hold regular 1-on-1s with top climate regulatory-focused secretaries (e.g., EPA, DOE) to manage the challenging decisions. On occasion, the OIRA administrator should convene multiple secretaries. The OIRA administrator should meet regularly (i.e., weekly) with the White House climate lead. These meetings will often provide a forum for cabinet secretaries to address rule issues. The OIRA administrator should be connected to, but not part of, a climate council to maintain its role and minimize political issues.

**Hire an experienced administrator and top appointee deputies.** We recommend experience from the start in these critical roles to address the enormous amount of work awaiting the new team. With prior experience at OMB, White House counsel or the agencies, the new team will know how to make things happen (e.g., how to leverage agencies, when to accelerate and when to pause) and avoid pitfalls.

**Assess agency regulatory strength.** OIRA will need to know the status of regulatory expertise at key regulatory agencies. Due to various personnel actions (transfers, retirements, and demoralized workforce), transition teams should work with OIRA to assess which agencies are ready to go and which agencies have gaps and need to be rebuilt, then work with OMB RMOs to flag those gaps for personnel investments. For example, EPA had deep RIA capacity prior to recent retirements. Prior to these retirements, EPA's work was high-quality data that could be trusted. If this proficiency has not been replaced, the regulatory process may be delayed.

**Supplement OIRA capacity during surge periods.** OIRA has been able to gain detailees from the Council of Economic Advisers in the past. OMB ART and new OIRA leadership should assess capacity needs for first six months and ability to surge if necessary.

## 4 Management Recommendations

OMB is well-positioned to support climate action throughout the federal government due to its cross-government role setting policy on a range of management functions. OMB's management role spans functions including government-wide procurement, information technology, financial management, strategic planning, and performance management, with several offices and Senate-confirmed officials reporting to the OMB Deputy Director for Management. OMB also works closely with other cross-government agencies such as the Office Personnel Management and the General Services Administration on other government-wide management issues related to government personnel and real estate.

OMB can help implement a number of cross-governmental management actions related to climate. For example:

- Using the federal government procurement system—which spends \$500 billion every year—to drive toward 100% clean energy and zero-emissions vehicles.
- Ensuring that all U.S. government installations, buildings, and facilities are more efficient and climate-ready, harnessing the purchasing power and supply chains to drive innovation.
- Committing that every federal infrastructure investment should reduce climate pollution, and requiring any federal permitting decision to consider the effects of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.
- Elevating climate change as a national security priority in coordination with the National Security Council, by commissioning analyses of the national and economic security impacts from climate change (including water scarcity, increased risks of conflict, impacts on state fragility, and large-scale migrations), and requiring annual threat/impact reports as well as comprehensive strategies on managing those impacts.
- Creating more resilient infrastructure that can withstand climate change, noting the example of a 2013 Executive Order that required federal agencies to release climate change adaptation plans to prepare for the adverse impacts of more extreme weather and rising sea levels.

During the transition and early months of a new administration, OMB should work to lay the groundwork for making progress on these types of management actions by incorporating climate considerations explicitly in the new administration's **President's Management Agenda**, the compilation of cross-government management initiatives that OMB drives centrally. The OMB Deputy Director for Management can work through two of OMB's statutory offices—the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and the Office of Personnel and Performance Management (OPPM)—as well as with GSA to devise and circulate management guidance memoranda to all Departments and Agencies incorporating climate goals. This guidance would direct agencies to begin taking steps to execute on, and regularly report progress toward, goals such as these:

**Leverage the procurement power of the federal government.** Work with agencies to incorporate Buy America, Buy Clean, Project Labor Agreements, and other climate and environmental/social justice criteria in procurement mechanisms.

**Enhance cross-government sustainability.** Direct agencies to devise agency sustainability plans including metrics and plans for key climate outcomes such as enhanced energy efficiency.

**Establish a federal energy efficiency fund.** Set aside a fund (perhaps modeled on IT Modernization Fund) to support agency investments that enhance energy efficiency, potentially administered via GSA with DOE in a technical advisory capacity.

## **Annex A - FY2021 Climate Budget Actions**

### **FY2021 Appropriations Negotiations Priorities - Funding**

| <b><u>Item #</u></b> | <b><u>Agency</u></b> | <b><u>Description</u></b>   |
|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| 1                    | Multiple             | <b>Climate Research:</b> Increase / restore coordinated cross-agency climate research funding, e.g. US Global Climate Research Program (USGCRP) at USGS, NASA, NSF, DOE, etc.   |
| 2                    | Multiple             | <b>Climate-related Staffing:</b> Increase funding for climate-related personnel / offices, e.g. EPA climate staffing, USDA climate hubs, DOT modal administration climate coordinators, State Dept. climate envoy office, DOI/BLM renewables permitting, etc. |
| 3                    | Multiple             | <b>Flex Funding:</b> Seek a modest discretionary pot or funding flexibility for Secretarial quick hit priorities, e.g. in DOE Dept. Administration account.   |
| 4                    | Multiple             | <b>Signaling / Pilot Investments:</b> Fund targeted items that signal a policy shift or kick-start funding for further investment in FY2022 and beyond. E.g.:   |
| 5                    | State                | <b>IPCC/UNFCCC</b> - restore funding levels to at least Obama levels to signal re-engagement on COPs and Paris agreement.   |
| 6                    | DOE                  | <b>CDR Pilot</b> - build on FY2020 funding allocation to continue CO2 removal pilot.  |

### **FY2021 Appropriations Negotiations Priorities - Funding**

| <b><u>Item #</u></b> | <b><u>Agency</u></b> | <b><u>Description</u></b>  |
|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| 1                    | State/<br>Treasury   | <b>GCF and Coal Riders</b> - avoid any restrictions on GCF contributions; remove riders that protect (or seek riders that restrict) coal in MDBs, DFC, ExIm. |
| 2                    | DOT                  | <b>EV Charging</b> - Address language restricting EV charging at rest-stops.   |
| 3                    | DOT                  | <b>CAFE Amendment</b> - Amend/clarify CAFE program language to account for electrification.  |

### **FY2021 Budget Execution Priorities**

| <b><u>Item #</u></b> | <b><u>Agency</u></b>    | <b><u>Description</u></b>  |
|----------------------|-------------------------|--|
| 1                    | DOE/DOI                 | <b>Redirect Research:</b> refocus DOE National Labs and USDA Research entities (Agriculture / Economic Research Services, NIFA, USGS, etc.) towards climate research.  |
| 2                    | DOE                     | <b>Target Energy Programs:</b> redirect DOE grantmaking within EERE and Fossil Energy programs towards breakthrough technologies vs. mature ones.  |
| 3                    | DOT/DOI                 | <b>Add Climate Criteria:</b> Use climate / air quality criteria to disburse grants within DOT programs (BUILD/Tiger grants, CMAQ); use adaptation/resilience metrics for National Parks and Fish & Wildlife within DOI.  |
| 4                    | State/<br>Int'l Affairs | <b>Target Int'l Finance:</b> State & Treasury to direct US international finance agencies (DFC, ExIm) and US contributions to international financial institutions (World Bank, other MBDs) to prioritize climate finance.   |
| 5                    | State/USAID             | <b>Re-Launch GCCI</b> - Restore Obama-era Global Climate Change Initiative for climate focused foreign assistance and financing support, using FY2020/2021 envt. earmarks, GEF, DFC/ExIm funding.  |
| 6                    | State/<br>Treasury      | <b>Fund Climate Finance from Carryover</b> - Review ESF/DA/AEECA funding balances to support funding transfers to GCF or to support private climate finance via DFC.   |
| 7                    | State/<br>Int'l Affairs | <b>Mobilize non-USG Climate Resources</b> - fund programs that mobilize the private sector, other donors, partner govts, or other partnerships to supplement US contributions with other funding, innovation.  |
| 8                    | State/<br>Int'l Affairs | <b>Funding Mechanisms</b> - fund programs or multilateral bodies using mechanisms (e.g. matching, conditionality) that link US funding to other donor contributions and/or progress on policy objectives (e.g. GCF reforms, aggressive NDCs by partner govts., etc.) |
| 9                    | DOI                     | <b>Redirect Permitting</b> - Reprogram BLM and Indian Affairs permitting resources from oil & gas to renewables; increase cost of O&G leasing and create parity for onshore / offshore O&G fees.   |

**Annex B: Climate Relevant Programs Across Government**

| Climate Plan Pillar       | Climate Plan Component                           | Agency                    | Program   | FY16   | FY17<br>Request | FY17   | FY18   | FY19   | FY20   | FY19-20<br>Change \$ | FY19-20<br>Change % |
|---------------------------|--|---------------------------|---|--------|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Clean Energy / Mitigation | Energy / Climate Research                        | DOE                       | Office of Science   | 5,347  |                 | 5,391  | 6,260  | 6,585  | 7,000  | 415                  | 6%                  |
|                           |  | DOE                       | Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy  | 2,069  |                 | 2,035  | 2,322  | 2,379  | 2,777  | 398                  | 17%                 |
|                           |  | DOE                       | Fossil Research and Development   | 632    |                 | 632    | 727    | 740    | 750    | 10                   | 1%                  |
|                           |  | DOE                       | ARPA-E  | 291    |                 | 306    | 353    | 366    | 425    | 59                   | 16%                 |
|                           |  | USDA                      | Agricultural Research Service   | 1,386  | 1,286           | 1,297  | 1,388  | 1,684  | 1,607  | (77)                 | -5%                 |
|                           |  | USDA                      | National Institute of Food and Agriculture  | 1,502  | 1,884           | 1,533  | 1,564  | 1,476  | 1,532  | 56                   | 4%                  |
|                           |  | USDA                      | Agriculture and Food Research Initiative (AFRI)   | 350    | 375             | 375    | 400    | 400    | 425    | 25                   | 6%                  |
|                           |  | NASA                      | Science - Earth Science   | 1,534  | -               | 1,617  | -      | 1,931  | 1,970  | 39                   | 2%                  |
|                           |  | NASA                      | Climate Absolute Radiance and Refractivity Observatory  | -      | -               | -      | -      | -      | 26     | 26                   | n/a                 |
|                           |  | NASA                      | Wide-Field InfraRed Survey Telescope  | -      | -               | -      | -      | -      | 511    | 511                  | n/a                 |
|                           |  | NSF                       | Research and Related Activities   | 339    | -               | 348    | -      | -      | -      | -                    | n/a                 |
|                           |  | NSF                       | Geosciences program   | 1,300  | -               | -      | -      | -      | -      | -                    | n/a                 |
|                           |  | NOAA                      | Climate Research Program  | -      | -               | -      | -      | 159    | -      | (159)                | n/a                 |
|                           |  | DOI                       | US Geological Survey  | 1,062  |                 | 1,085  | 1,149  | 1,260  | 1,272  | 12                   | 1%                  |
|                           |  | EPA                       | Science and Technology (may overlap with 3 rows below)  | 735    | 754             | 733    | 709    | 714    | 716    | 2                    | 0%                  |
|                           |  | EPA                       | Air and Energy Research   | 92     | 101             | 92     | 91     | 92     | 94     | 2                    | 2%                  |
|                           |  | EPA                       | Atmospheric Protection Program  | 103    | 116             | 103    | 103    | 103    | 102    | (1)                  | -1%                 |
|                           |  | EPA                       | Federal Vehicle Fuel Standards and Certification  | 93     | 104             | 93     | 93     | 94     | 95     | 1                    | 1%                  |
|                           |  | Various                   | US Global Change Research Program (overlap w/ rows above)   | 2,584  | -               | 2,775  | 2,546  | n/a    | n/a    | n/a                  | n/a                 |
| Clean Energy / Mitigation | ARPA-C / Nuclear Energy Future                   | DOE?                      | New entity? Expansion / collaboration of ARPA-E & other?  | n/a    | n/a             | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    |                      |                     |
|                           |  | DOE                       | Nuclear Energy  | n/a    | n/a             | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    |                      |                     |
| Clean Energy / Mitigation | CCS Deployment                                   | DOE                       | Element within DOE Fossil Energy R&D (above); possibly DOE loan programs office (energy loans and guarantees)                     | n/a    | n/a             | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    |                      |                     |
| Clean Energy / Mitigation | Building Energy Efficiency                       | DOE / HUD                 | Affordable energy efficiency home retrofits; low income housing efficiency. Appliance efficiency standards; building inspections. | n/a    | n/a             | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    |                      |                     |
| Clean Energy / Mitigation | Low Carbon Mfg. Sector / Tax Credits & Subsidies | Commerce & Treasury (tax) | Requires further definition.  | n/a    | n/a             | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    |                      |                     |
| Clean Energy / Mitigation | EV charging infrastructure and tax               | DOT / Treasury (tax)      | Federal Highway Administration programs   | n/a    | n/a             | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    |                      |                     |
|                           |  |                           | FHWA - 21st Century Clean Transportation Plan Investments   | -      | 7,500           | -      | -      | -      | -      | -                    | n/a                 |
| Clean Energy / Mitigation | Aircraft Fuels                                   | DOT                       | FAA - Research, Engineering & Development   | 166    | 168             | 177    | 175    | 191    | 193    | 2                    | 1%                  |
|                           |  | DOT                       | FAA - Total NextGen Programs  | 980    | 1,000           | 1,055  | 1,081  | 953    | 1,227  | 274                  | 29%                 |
| Clean Energy / Mitigation | Biodiversity / Conservation / Env't. Protection  | DOI                       | Bureau of Land Management   | 1,252  |                 | 1,268  | 1,349  | 1,366  | 1,384  | 18                   | 1%                  |
|                           |  | DOI                       | Bureau of Ocean Energy Management   | 74     |                 | 75     | 114    | 129    | 132    | 3                    | 2%                  |
|                           |  | DOI                       | Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement  | 88     |                 | 83     | 123    | 136    | 133    | (3)                  | -2%                 |
|                           |  | DOI                       | Bureau of Indian Affairs  | 2,796  |                 | 2,860  | 3,064  | 3,081  | 2,047  | (1,034)              | -34%                |
|                           |  | USDA                      | Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS)   | 4,126  | 4,745           | 4,520  | 5,202  | 5,110  | 5,876  | 766                  | 15%                 |
|                           |  | USDA                      | Farm Service Agency - Conservation Programs   | 1,841  | 1,923           | 1,886  | 2,130  | 2,089  | 2,044  | (45)                 | -2%                 |
|                           |  | USDA                      | Forest Service - National Forest System   | 1,509  | 1,501           | 1,903  | 1,890  | 1,924  | 1,958  | 34                   | 2%                  |
| Clean Energy / Mitigation | Advanced biofuels                                | DOE / USDA                | USDA and DOE research / deployment programs? (noted above).   | n/a    | n/a             | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    |                      |                     |
|                           | Farm emissions partnerships                      | USDA                      | Regional Climate Hubs (funded from USDA operations accounts)  | n/a    | n/a             | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    |                      |                     |
|                           |  | USDA                      | USDA/CCC) funded / administered carbon pricing mechanism?   | n/a    | n/a             | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    |                      |                     |
|                           |  | USDA                      | Farm Service Agency - Farm Loan and Grant Program   | n/a    | n/a             | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    | n/a    |                      |                     |
| Clean Energy / Mitigation | Total  | Multiple                  | Programs / Accounts that fund climate goals (includes some overlap and non-climate programs)                                      | 32,251 | 21,457          | 32,242 | 32,834 | 32,962 | 34,295 | 1,334                | 4%                  |

**Annex B: Climate Relevant Programs Across Government**

| Climate Plan Pillar    | Climate Plan Component   | Agency                 | Program  | FY16          | FY17<br>Request | FY17          | FY18          | FY19          | FY20          | FY19-20<br>Change \$ | FY19-20<br>Change % |
|------------------------|--|------------------------|--|---------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Resilience             | Rail Transportation Investments  | DOT                    | Amtrak   | 1,390         | 1,500           | 1,495         | 1,159         | 1,292         | 1,300         | 8                    | 1%                  |
|                        |  | DOT                    | <i>Northeast Corridor Corridor Grants to Amtrak</i>  | 19            | -               | 328           | 325           | 650           | 700           | 50                   | 8%                  |
|                        |  | DOT                    | Capital Assistance for High Speed Rail Corridors   | -             | -               | -             | -             | -             | -             | -                    | n/a                 |
|                        |  | DOT                    | FRA - 21st Century Clean Transportation Plan Investments   | -             | 3,700           | -             | -             | -             | -             | -                    | n/a                 |
| Resilience             | Other Clean Transportation   | DOT                    | BUILD (formerly TIGER)   | 500           | 1,250           | 500           | 497           | 900           | 1,000         | 100                  | 11%                 |
|                        |  | DOT                    | Congestion mitigation and air quality improvement program  | 2,309         | 2,400           | 2,357         | 2,403         | 2,449         | 2,498         | 49                   | 2%                  |
|                        |  | DOT                    | FTA - 21st Century Clean Transportation Plan Investments   | 9,348         | 10,259          | -             | -             | -             | -             | -                    | n/a                 |
|                        |  | DOT                    | NHTSA - 21st Century Clean Transportation Plan Investments   | -             | 200             | -             | -             | -             | -             | -                    | n/a                 |
| Resilience             | Resilient Infrastructure   | Various                | TBD  | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| Resilience             | Coastal Restoration  | Various (incl. NOAA)   | Coastal Climate Resilience Program   | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| Resilience             | Clean Water  | EPA                    | Clean Water State Revolving Fund   | 1,394         | 980             | 1,391         | 1,384         | 1,694         | 1,639         | (55)                 | -3%                 |
|                        |  | EPA                    | Drinking Water State Revolving Fund  | 863           | 1,021           | 862           | 857           | 1,163         | 1,126         | (37)                 | -3%                 |
| Resilience             | Risk Reduction & Adaptation Planning                                   | USDA                   | Drought resistance / crop insurance programs   | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
|                        |  | USDA                   | Forest Service - Wildland Fire Activities  | 2,387         | 2,452           | 2,331         | 2,880         | 2,880         | 2,351         | (529)                | -18%                |
|                        |  | USDA/DOI               | Forest Service / DOI "Fire Fix"  | -             | -               | -             | -             | -             | 2,250         | 2,250                | n/a                 |
|                        |  | DOI                    | Wildland fire resistance   | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
|                        |  | Various                | Multihazard resilience - Programs TBD  |               |                 |               |               |               |               |                      |                     |
|                        |  | DHS/FEMA               | Flood Resilience /Flood hazard mapping (RiskMAP)   | -             | -               | -             | -             | 263           | -             |                      |                     |
|                        |  | DOI                    | National Park Service  | 2,851         |                 | 2,932         | 3,202         | 3,223         | 3,374         | 151                  | 5%                  |
|                        |  | DOI                    | Land & Water Conservation Fund   | 28            |                 | 28            | 28            | 28            | (28)          | (56)                 | -200%               |
| <b>Resilience</b>      | <b>Total</b>   | <b>Multiple</b>        | <b>Programs / Accounts that fund climate goals (includes some overlap and non-climate programs)</b>                      | <b>21,089</b> | <b>23,762</b>   | <b>12,224</b> | <b>12,735</b> | <b>14,542</b> | <b>16,210</b> | <b>1,668</b>         | <b>11%</b>          |
| Rally the world        | Paris / Climate IO's   | State                  | International Organizations and Programs (IOP total)   | 339           | 333             | 307           | 308           | 339           | 391           | 52                   | 15%                 |
|                        |  |                        | <i>of which, IOP funding for UNFCCC/IPCC</i>   | <i>10</i>     | <i>13</i>       | <i>6</i>      | <i>6</i>      | <i>6</i>      | <i>6</i>      | <i>-</i>             | <i>0%</i>           |
|                        |  | State / EPA            | Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund (& Kigali Amendment)   | 25            | 33              | 32            | 29            | 29            | 32            | 3                    | 10%                 |
| Rally the world        | Multilateral Finance (incl. GCF)                                       | State / Treasury       | Green Climate Fund (and Precursor Climate Invnt. Funds)  | 230           | 750*            | 1000*         | -             | -             | -             | -                    |                     |
|                        |  | Treasury               | Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)  | 1,816         | 1,803           | 1,571         | 1,348         | 1,348         | 1,522         | 174                  | 13%                 |
|                        |  | Treasury               | Global Environment Facility  | 168           | 147             | 147           | 140           | 140           | 140           | -                    | 0%                  |
| Rally the world        | Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCII) & Int'l Climate Collaboration | State / USAID / MCC    | Economic & Development Assistance Accounts (ESF, DA, AEECA, MCC)   | 8,969         | 10,041          | 9,548         | 8,616         | 8,382         | 8,120         | (262)                | -3%                 |
| Rally the world        | Clean Energy Export / Climate Investment                               | ExIm                   | Export Import Bank of the US - Operations and Subsidy  | 101           | 126             | 105           | 105           | 110           | 110           | -                    | 0%                  |
|                        |  | DFC                    | Development Finance Corporation (and precursors - OPIC and USAID/DCA) - Operations, Programs (incl. subsidy, TA, equity) | 93            | 118             | 102           | 109           | 109           | 301           | 192                  | 176%                |
|                        |  | New Entity?            | Proposal may envision a new program or agency  | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
|                        |  | Treasury               | Bilateral debt relief (e.g. COVID related) / technical assistance linked to climate invtmt.                              | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| Rally the world        | Fossil Fuel Subsidies  | Treasury               | Subsidy harmonization / elimination  | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| Rally the world        | Diplomatic capacity  | Int'l Affairs Agencies | Salary & Expenses / Operations accounts of State, USAID, Treasury  | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| Rally the world        | Military resilience  | DOD                    | Military bases resilience / critical sec. infrastructure   | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| <b>Rally the world</b> | <b>Total</b>   | <b>Multiple</b>        | <b>Programs / Accounts that fund climate goals (includes some overlap and non-climate programs)</b>                      | <b>11,752</b> | <b>12,613</b>   | <b>11,818</b> | <b>11,027</b> | <b>11,229</b> | <b>11,428</b> | <b>199</b>           | <b>2%</b>           |



**Annex B: Climate Relevant Programs Across Government**

| Climate Plan Pillar          | Climate Plan Component                           | Agency             | Program   | FY16          | FY17<br>Request | FY17          | FY18          | FY19          | FY20          | FY19-20<br>Change \$ | FY19-20<br>Change % |
|------------------------------|--|--------------------|---|---------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Environmental Justice        | Polluter Accountability                          | EPA                | EPA enforcement   | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
|                              |  | DOJ                | Environmental and Natural Resources Division - Enforcement  | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| Environmental Justice        | Safe Drinking Water                              | EPA                | Clean Water Revolving Loan Fund (State formula driven)  | 1,394         | 980             | 1,391         | 1,384         | 1,694         | 1,639         | (55)                 | -3%                 |
|                              |  | EPA                | Drinking Water Revolving Loan Fund (State formula driven)   | 863           | 1,021           | 862           | 857           | 1,163         | 1,126         | (37)                 | -3%                 |
|                              |  | USDA               | Water / Wastewater Grants and Direct Loans (State formula driven)                                   | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| Environmental Justice        | Underserved Communities Access to Grant Programs |                    | Budget administration / execution changes   | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| Environmental Justice        | Community Driven Approaches / Fed Protections    |                    | Budget administration / execution changes   | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| <b>Environmental Justice</b> | <b>Total</b>                                     | <b>Multiple</b>    | <b>Programs / Accounts that fund climate goals (includes some overlap and non-climate programs)</b> | <b>2,257</b>  | <b>2,001</b>    | <b>2,253</b>  | <b>2,241</b>  | <b>2,857</b>  | <b>2,765</b>  | <b>(92)</b>          | <b>-3%</b>          |
| Economic Justice             | Climate Impacted (coal, etc.) Community          | TBD?               | TBD?  | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| Economic Justice             | Worker Protections & Training                    | DOL?<br>Others TBD | Coal Miner benefits / black lung benefits program (& reforms)                                       | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| Economic Justice             | Economic Development (Denali, ARC, etc.)         | Commerce           | Economic Development Agency   | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
|                              |  | Commerce           | Denali Commission   | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
|                              |  | Commerce           | Appalachian Regional Commission   | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
|                              |  | USDA               | Regional Climate Hubs (funded from USDA operations accounts)  | n/a           | n/a             | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           | n/a           |                      |                     |
| <b>Economic Justice</b>      | <b>Total</b>                                     | <b>Multiple</b>    | <b>Programs / Accounts that fund climate goals (includes some overlap and non-climate programs)</b> | <b>-</b>      | <b>-</b>        | <b>-</b>      | <b>-</b>      | <b>-</b>      | <b>-</b>      | <b>-</b>             | <b>n/a</b>          |
| <b>All Pillars</b>           | <b>All Components</b>                            | <b>Multiple</b>    | <b>Programs / Accounts that fund climate goals (includes some overlap and non-climate programs)</b> | <b>67,349</b> | <b>59,832</b>   | <b>58,537</b> | <b>58,836</b> | <b>61,589</b> | <b>64,698</b> | <b>3,109</b>         | <b>5%</b>           |

## Annex C: Climate Regulations and Actions

| #  | Priority | Status    | Type                        | Agency  | Type | Description  |
|----|----------|-----------|-----------------------------|---------|------|--|
| 1  | Day 1    | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EPA     |      | Canceled a <b>requirement for oil and gas companies to report methane emissions</b> .  |
| 2  | Day 1    | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EPA     |      | Revoked <b>California's power to set its own more stringent emissions standards</b> for cars and light trucks..  |
| 3  | Day 1    | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EPA     |      | Stopped enforcing a 2015 <b>rule that prohibited the use of hydrofluorocarbons, powerful greenhouse gases, in air-conditioners and refrigerators</b> .   |
| 4  | Day 1    | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EOP     | EO   | Directed agencies to stop using an <b>Obama-era calculation of the “social cost of carbon”</b> that rulemakers used to estimate the long-term economic benefits of reducing carbon dioxide emissions.  |
| 5  | Day 1    | Completed | Drilling and extraction     | DOI     | CRA  | Lifted <b>ban on drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge</b> . <b>Congress</b> .   |
| 6  | Day 1    | Completed | Infrastructure and planning | EOP     | EO   | Revoked <b>Obama-era flood standards for federal infrastructure projects</b> , like roads and bridges. The standards required the government to account for sea-level rise and other climate change effects.   |
| 7  | Day 1    | Completed | Infrastructure and planning | EOP     | EO   | Relaxed the <b>environmental review process for federal infrastructure projects</b> .  |
| 8  | Day 1    | Completed | Infrastructure and planning | DOI-NPS |      | Withdrew an Obama-era order to <b>consider climate change in managing natural resources in national parks</b> .  |
| 9  | Day 1    | Completed | Other                       | DOJ     |      | <b>Limited funding environmental and community development projects through corporate settlements of federal lawsuits</b> .  |
| 10 | Day 1    | Completed | Other                       | EOP     | EO   | Announced <b>intent to stop payments to the Green Climate Fund</b> , a United Nations program to help poorer countries reduce carbon emissions.  |
| 11 | Day 100  | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EPA     |      | Replaced the <b>Obama-era Clean Power Plan</b> , which would have set strict limits on carbon emissions from coal- and gas-fired power plants, with a new version that would let states set their own rules.Executive Order.   |
| 12 | Day 100  | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EPA     |      | Revised a <b>permitting program designed to safeguard communities from increases in pollution from new power plants</b> to make it easier for facilities to avoid emissions regulations.   |
| 13 | Day 100  | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EPA     |      | Amended <b>rules that govern how refineries monitor pollution</b> in surrounding communities.  |
| 14 | Day 100  | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | CEQ     | EO   | Withdrew <b>guidance that federal agencies include greenhouse gas emissions in environmental reviews</b> . But several district courts have ruled that emissions must be included in such reviews.   |
| 15 | Day 100  | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EOP     | EO   | Revoked an Obama executive order that set a <b>goal of cutting the federal government’s greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent over 10 years</b> .   |
| 16 | Day 100  | Completed | Drilling and extraction     | DOI     |      | Made significant <b>cuts to the borders of two national monuments in Utah and recommended border and resource management changes to several more</b> . (Presidential Proclamation)   |
| 17 | Day 100  | Completed | Drilling and extraction     | NOAA    |      | Permitted the <b>use of seismic air guns for gas and oil exploration in the Atlantic Ocean</b> . The practice, which can kill marine life and disrupt fisheries, was blocked under the Obama administration.   |
| 18 | Day 100  | Completed | Infrastructure and planning | EOP     | EO   | Revoked a <b>directive for federal agencies to minimize impacts on water, wildlife, land and other natural resources</b> when approving development projects.  |
| 19 | Day 100  | Completed | Infrastructure and planning | DOI     |      | Restricted most <b>environmental studies to one year in length and a maximum of 150 pages</b> , citing a need to reduce paperwork.   |
| 20 | Day 100  | Completed | Infrastructure and planning | DOI     |      | Withdrew a number of Obama-era <b>climate change and conservation policies that the agency said could “burden the development or utilization of domestically produced energy resources.”</b>   |
| 21 | Day 100  | Completed | Infrastructure and planning | DOI     |      | Eliminated the use of an Obama-era <b>planning system designed to minimize harm from oil and gas activity on sensitive landscapes</b> , such as national parks.  |
| 22 | Day 100  | Completed | Animals                     | DOI     |      | Changed the way the <b>Endangered Species Act is applied, making it more difficult to protect wildlife from long-term threats posed by climate change</b> .  |
| 23 | Day 100  | Completed | Water pollution             | EPA-ACE |      | Scaled back <b>pollution protections for certain tributaries and wetlands that were regulated under the Clean Water Act</b> by the Obama administration.   |
| 24 | Day 100  | Completed | Other                       | DOE     |      | Repealed an Obama-era regulation that would have <b>nearly doubled the number of light bulbs subject to energy-efficiency standards</b> starting in January 2020. The EPA also blocked the next phase of efficiency standards for general-purpose bulbs already subject to regulation. |
| 25 | Day 100  | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | DOI     |      | Revised and partially repealed an Obama-era rule <b>limiting methane emissions on public lands</b> , including intentional venting and flaring from drilling operations.   |
| 26 | Day 365  | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | DOT     |      | Repealed a <b>requirement that state and regional authorities track tailpipe emissions</b> from vehicles traveling on federal highways.  |
| 27 | Day 365  | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EPA     |      | Weakened an <b>Obama-era rule meant to reduce air pollution in national parks and wilderness areas</b> .   |
| 28 | Day 365  | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EPA     |      | Weakened oversight of <b>some state plans for reducing air pollution in national parks</b> .   |
| 29 | Day 365  | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EPA     |      | Lifted a <b>summertime ban on the use of E15</b> , a gasoline blend made of 15 percent ethanol. (Burning gasoline with a higher concentration of ethanol in hot conditions increases smog.).   |
| 30 | Day 365  | Completed | Air pollution and emissions | EPA     |      | Changed rules to allow states and the EPA. to take longer to develop and approve <b>plans aimed at cutting methane emissions from existing landfills</b> .   |
| 31 | Day 365  | Completed | Drilling and extraction     | DOI     |      | Rescinded <b>water pollution regulations for fracking on federal and Indian lands</b> .  |
| 32 | Day 365  | Completed | Drilling and extraction     | EPA     |      | Scrapped a proposed rule that <b>required mines to prove they could pay to clean up future pollution</b> .   |

## Annex C: Climate Regulations and Actions

| #  | Priority | Status     | Type                        | Agency      | Type | Description  |
|----|----------|------------|-----------------------------|-------------|------|--|
| 33 | Day 365  | Completed  | Drilling and extraction     | DOI         |      | Withdrew a requirement that <b>Gulf oil rig owners prove they could cover the costs of removing rigs once they have stopped producing.</b>   |
| 34 | Day 365  | Completed  | Drilling and extraction     | FERC        |      | Changed how the <b>Federal Energy Regulatory Commission considers the indirect effects of greenhouse gas emissions in environmental reviews of pipelines.</b> Federal Energy Regulatory Commission   |
| 35 | Day 365  | Completed  | Drilling and extraction     | DOI         |      | Loosened <b>offshore drilling safety regulations</b> implemented by the Obama administration following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill, including <b>reduced testing requirements for blowout prevention systems.</b>   |
| 36 | Day 365  | Completed  | Infrastructure and planning | EOP         | EO   | Revoked an Obama executive order <b>promoting “climate resilience” in the northern Bering Sea region of Alaska</b> , which withdrew local waters from oil and gas leasing and established a tribal advisory council to consult on local environmental issues.  |
| 37 | Day 365  | Completed  | Infrastructure and planning | FCC         |      | Eased the <b>environmental review processes for small wireless infrastructure projects with the goal of expanding 5G wireless networks.</b>  |
| 38 | Day 365  | Completed  | Infrastructure and planning | DOI         |      | Withdrew Obama-era <b>policies designed to maintain or, ideally improve, natural resources affected by federal projects.</b>   |
| 39 | Day 365  | Completed  | Animals                     | DOI         |      | Overturned a <b>ban on the use of lead ammunition and fishing tackle on federal lands.</b>   |
| 40 | Day 365  | Completed  | Animals                     | CRA         | CRA  | Overturned a <b>ban on the hunting of predators in Alaskan wildlife refuges.</b> Congress  |
| 41 | Day 365  | Completed  | Animals                     | NOAA        |      | Amended <b>fishing regulations for a number of species to allow for longer seasons and higher catch rates.</b>   |
| 42 | Day 365  | Completed  | Animals                     | NOAA        |      | Withdrew <b>proposed limits on the number of endangered marine mammals and sea turtles that can be unintentionally killed or injured with sword-fishing nets</b> by people who fish on the West Coast. (In 2018, California issued a state rule prohibiting the use of the nets the rule was intending to regulate.)   |
| 43 | Day 365  | Completed  | Animals                     | DOI         |      | Rolled back a roughly 40-year-old <b>interpretation of a policy aimed at protecting migratory birds</b> , potentially running afoul of treaties with Canada and Mexico.  |
| 44 | Day 365  | Completed  | Water pollution             | EPA         |      | Withdrew a proposed rule aimed at <b>reducing pollutants, including air pollution, at sewage treatment plants.</b>   |
| 45 | Day 365  | Completed  | Water pollution             | EPA         |      | Withdrew a proposed rule requiring <b>groundwater protections for certain uranium mines.</b>   |
| 46 | Day 365  | Completed  | Other                       | DOI         |      | Allowed <b>coastal replenishment projects to use sand from protected beaches.</b>  |
| 47 | Day 365  | Completed  | Air pollution and emissions | EPA         |      | Loosened a Clinton-era rule designed to <b>limit toxic emissions from major industrial polluters.</b>  |
| 48 | Day 365  | Completed  | Drilling and extraction     | EOP         | EO   | Revoked an Obama-era executive order designed to <b>preserve ocean, coastal and Great Lakes waters in favor of a policy focused on energy production and economic growth.</b>  |
| 49 | Day 365  | Completed  | Animals                     | DOI         |      | Overturned a <b>ban on using parts of migratory birds in handicrafts</b> made by Alaskan Natives.  |
| 50 | Day 365  | Completed  | Toxic substances and safety | EPA         |      | Rejected a <b>proposed ban on chlorpyrifos, a pesticide linked to developmental disabilities in children.</b> (A European Union ban is to take effect in 2020.)  |
| 51 | Day 365  | Completed  | Toxic substances and safety | EPA         |      | Narrowed the scope of a 2016 law <b>mandating safety assessments for potentially toxic chemicals like dry-cleaning solvents.</b> The EPA said it would focus on direct exposure and exclude indirect exposure such as from air or water contamination. In November, a court of appeals ruled the agency must widen its scope to consider full exposure risks.. |
| 52 | Day 365  | Completed  | Toxic substances and safety | DOT         |      | Reversed an Obama-era rule that <b>required braking system upgrades for “high hazard” trains hauling flammable liquids</b> , like oil and ethanol.   |
| 53 | Day 365  | Completed  | Toxic substances and safety | EPA         |      | Removed <b>copper filter cake, an electronics manufacturing byproduct comprised of heavy metals, from the “hazardous waste” list.</b>  |
| 54 | Day 365  | Completed  | Toxic substances and safety | DOL         |      | Ended an <b>Occupational Safety and Health Administration program to reduce risks of workers developing the lung disease silicosis.</b>  |
| 55 | Day 365  | Completed  | Other                       | DOI         |      | Reversed <b>restrictions on the sale of plastic water bottles in national parks</b> designed to cut down on litter, despite a Park Service report that the effort worked.  |
| 56 | NA       | Completed  | Drilling and extraction     | ACE         | EO   | Approved <b>construction of the Dakota Access pipeline</b> less than a mile from the Standing Rock Sioux reservation. Under the Obama administration, the Army Corps of Engineers had said it would explore alternative routes.  |
| 57 | NA       | Completed  | Infrastructure and planning | DOI         | CRA  | Reversed an update to the Bureau of Land Management’s public land use planning process. <b>Congress</b>  |
| 58 | NA       | Completed  | Water pollution             | CRA         | CRA  | Revoked a rule that prevented <b>coal companies from dumping mining debris into local streams.</b> <b>Congress</b>   |
| 59 | Withdraw | In Process | Air pollution and emissions | EPA         |      | Proposed relaxing Obama-era <b>requirements that companies monitor and repair methane leaks at oil and gas facilities.</b>   |
| 60 | Withdraw | In Process | Air pollution and emissions | EPA-<br>DOT |      | Proposed <b>weakening Obama-era fuel-economy standards for cars and light trucks.</b>  |
| 61 | Withdraw | In Process | Air pollution and emissions | EO          |      | Submitted notice of <b>intent to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate agreement.</b> The process of withdrawing cannot be completed until November 2020.  |
| 62 | Withdraw | In Process | Air pollution and emissions | EPA         |      | Proposed <b>eliminating Obama-era restrictions that in effect required newly built coal power plants to capture carbon dioxide emissions..</b>   |
| 63 | Withdraw | In Process | Air pollution and emissions | EPA         |      | Proposed a <b>legal justification for weakening an Obama-era rule that limited mercury emissions from coal power plants.</b>   |
| 64 | Withdraw | In Process | Air pollution and emissions | EPA         | EO   | Proposed <b>revisions to standards for carbon dioxide emissions from new, modified and reconstructed power plants.</b>   |
| 65 | Withdraw | In Process | Air pollution and emissions | EPA         |      | Began a <b>review of emissions rules for power plant start-ups, shutdowns and malfunctions.</b> In April, the EPA proposed reversing a requirement that Texas follow the emissions rule, with implications for 35 other states.  |
| 66 | Withdraw | In Process | Air pollution and emissions | EPA         |      | Proposed the <b>repeal of rules meant to reduce leaking and venting of hydrofluorocarbons from large refrigeration and air conditioning systems.</b>   |
| 67 | Withdraw | In Process | Air pollution and emissions | EPA         |      | Opened for comment a proposal <b>limiting the ability of individuals and communities to challenge EPA-issued pollution permits before a panel of agency judges.</b>  |

### Annex C: Climate Regulations and Actions

| #  | Priority | Status     | Type                        | Agency   | Type | Description  |
|----|----------|------------|-----------------------------|----------|------|--|
| 68 | Withdraw | In process | Drilling and extraction     | DOI      |      | Proposed <b>opening most of America’s coastal waters to offshore oil and gas drilling, but delayed the plan after a federal judge ruled that Mr. Trump’s reversal of an Obama-era ban on drilling in the Arctic Ocean was unlawful.</b>  |
| 69 | Withdraw | In process | Drilling and extraction     | DOI      | EO   | Lifted an <b>Obama-era freeze on new coal leases on public lands</b> . But, in April 2019, a judge ruled that the could not begin selling new leases without completing an environmental review. A month later, the agency published a draft assessment that concluded restarting federal coal leasing would have little environmental impact. |
| 70 | Withdraw | In process | Drilling and extraction     | DOI      |      | Repealed an Obama-era rule governing <b>royalties for oil, gas and coal leases on federal lands</b> , which replaced a 1980s rule that critics said allowed companies to underpay the federal government. A federal judge struck down the Trump administration’s repeal. The is reviewing the decision.  |
| 71 | Withdraw | In process | Drilling and extraction     | DOI      | EO   | Proposed <b>revising regulations on offshore oil and gas exploration by floating vessels in the Arctic</b> that were developed after a 2013 accident. The previously said it was “considering full rescission or revision of this rule.”   |
| 72 | Withdraw | In process | Drilling and extraction     | USDA-DOI |      | Proposed <b>“streamlining” the approval process for drilling for oil and gas in national forests.</b>  |
| 73 | Withdraw | In process | Drilling and extraction     | NOAA     | EO   | Recommended <b>shrinking three marine protected areas, or opening them to commercial fishing.</b>  |
| 74 | Withdraw | In process | Drilling and extraction     | DOI      |      | Proposed <b>opening land in the Alaska National Petroleum Reserve for oil and leasing</b> . The Obama administration had designated the reserve as a conservation area.  |
| 75 | Withdraw | In process | Drilling and extraction     | DOI      |      | Proposed <b>lifting a Clinton-era policy that banned logging and road construction in Alaska’s Tongass National Forest.</b>  |
| 76 | Withdraw | In process | Drilling and extraction     | State    |      | Approved the <b>Keystone XL pipeline</b> rejected by President Barack Obama, but a federal judge blocked the project from going forward without an adequate environmental review process. Mr. Trump later attempted to side-step the ruling by issuing a presidential permit, but the project remains tied up in court.                        |
| 77 | Withdraw | In process | Infrastructure and planning | USDA     |      | Proposed plans to <b>streamline the environmental review process for Forest Service projects.</b>  |
| 78 | Withdraw | In process | Animals                     | DOI      |      | <b>Opened nine million acres of Western land to oil and gas drilling by weakening habitat protections for the sage grouse</b> , an imperiled bird with an elaborate mating dance. An Idaho District Court injunction blocked the measure.  |
| 79 | Withdraw | In process | Animals                     | DOI-NPS  |      | Proposed ending an Obama-era rule that barred <b>using bait to lure and kill grizzly bears</b> , among other sport hunting practices that many people consider extreme, on some public lands in Alaska.  |
| 80 | Withdraw | In process | Animals                     | DOI      | EO   | Proposed relaxing <b>environmental protections for salmon and smelt in California’s Central Valley</b> in order to free up water for farmers.  |
| 81 | Withdraw | In process | Toxic substances and safety | DOT      |      | Proposed changing <b>safety rules to allow for rail transport of liquefied natural gas</b> , which is highly flammable.  |
| 82 | Withdraw | In process | Toxic substances and safety | EPA      |      | Rolled back most of the requirements of a 2017 rule aimed at improving <b>safety at sites that use hazardous chemicals</b> that was instituted after a chemical plant exploded in Texas.   |
| 83 | Withdraw | In process | Toxic substances and safety | DOL      |      | Announced a review of an Obama-era rule <b>lowering coal dust limits in mines</b> . The head of the Mine Safety and Health Administration said there were no immediate plans to change the dust limit but has extended an public comment period until 2022.  |
| 84 | Withdraw | In process | Water pollution             | EPA      |      | Proposed a rule <b>exempting certain types of power plants from parts of an EPA rule limiting toxic discharge</b> from power plants into public waterways.   |
| 85 | Withdraw | In process | Water pollution             | EPA      | EO   | Proposed allowing the <b>EPA to issue permits for federal projects under the Clean Water Act over state objections</b> if they don't meet local water quality goals, including for pipelines and other fossil fuel facilities.   |
| 86 | Withdraw | In process | Water pollution             | EPA      |      | Proposed <b>extending the lifespan of unlined coal ash holding areas</b> , which can spill their contents because they lack a protective underlay.   |
| 87 | Withdraw | In process | Water pollution             | EPA      |      | Proposed a regulation limiting the scope of an Obama-era rule under which companies had to prove that <b>large deposits of recycled coal ash would not harm the environment.</b>   |
| 88 | Withdraw | In process | Water pollution             | EPA      |      | Proposed a new rule allowing the federal government to issue <b>permits for coal ash waste in Indian Country</b> and some states without review if the disposal site is in compliance with federal regulations..   |
| 89 | Withdraw | In process | Water pollution             | EPA      |      | Proposed <b>doubling the time allowed to remove lead pipes from water systems with high levels of lead.</b>  |
| 90 | Withdraw | In process | Other                       | EPA      |      | Ordered a review of <b>water efficiency standards in bathroom fixtures</b> , including toilets.  |
| 91 | Withdraw | In process | Other                       | EPA      |      | Proposed <b>limiting the studies used by the EPA for rulemaking to only those that make data publicly available.</b> (Scientists widely criticized the proposal, who said it would effectively block the agency from considering landmark research that relies on confidential health data.).  |

### Annex C: Climate Regulations and Actions

| #   | Priority | Status     | Type  | Agency | Type | Description   |
|---|----------|------------|-------|--------|------|---|
| 92  | Withdraw | In process | Other | EPA    |      | Proposed <b>changes to the way cost-benefit analyses are conducted under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act and other environmental statutes.</b>   |
| 93  | Withdraw | In process | Other | DOE    |      | Proposed <b>withdrawing efficiency standards for residential furnaces and commercial water heaters</b> designed to reduce energy use.   |
| 94  | Withdraw | In process | Other | DOE    |      | Created a <b>product category that would allow some dishwashers to be exempt from energy efficiency standards.</b>  |
| 95  | Withdraw | In process | Other | DOT    |      | Initially withdrew then delayed a proposed rule that would <b>inform car owners about fuel-efficient replacement tires.</b> (The has scheduled a new rulemaking notice for 2020.)                       |
| 10 rules were reinstated, often following lawsuits and other challenges |          |            |       |        |      |   |
| 1   |          | Reinstated | Other |        |      | Weakened federal rules regulating the disposal and storage of coal ash waste from power plants. A court later ruled the administration was attempting to weaken rules that were not stringent enough.   |
| 2   |          | Reinstated | Other |        |      | Reversed course on repealing emissions standards for “glider” trucks — vehicles retrofitted with older, often dirtier engines   |
| 3   |          | Reinstated | Other |        |      | Delayed a compliance deadline for new national ozone pollution standards by one year, but later reversed course.  |
| 4   |          | Reinstated | Other | DOD    |      | Suspended an effort to lift restrictions on mining in Bristol Bay, Alaska. But the Army Corps of Engineers is performing an environmental review of an application for mining in the area.              |
| 5   |          | Reinstated | Other |        |      | Delayed implementation of a rule regulating the certification and training of pesticide applicators, but a judge ruled that the . had done so illegally and declared the rule still in effect.          |
| 6   |          | Reinstated | Other | DOE    |      | Initially delayed publishing efficiency standards for household appliances, but later published them after multiple states and environmental groups sued.   |
| 7   |          | Reinstated | Other | DOE    |      | Delayed federal building efficiency standards until Sept. 30, 2017, at which time the rules went into effect.   |
| 8   |          | Reinstated | Other |        |      | Reissued a rule limiting the discharge of mercury by dental offices into municipal sewers after a lawsuit by the Natural Resources Defense Council, an advocacy group.                                  |
| 9   |          | Reinstated | Other |        |      | Re-posted a proposed rule limiting greenhouse gas emissions from aircraft, after initially changing its status to “inactive” on the website. In May 2019, the agency confirmed it would issue the rule. |
| 10  |          | Reinstated | Other |        |      | Removed the Yellowstone grizzly bear from the Endangered Species List, but the protections were later reinstated by a federal judge. (The Trump administration appealed the ruling in May 2019.)        |